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Abstract The need to provide standard commercial-grade productivity applica-
tions as the general purpose user interface to high-assurance data pro-
cessing environments is compelling, and has resulted in proposals for
several dierent types of \trusted" systems. We characterize some of
these systems as a class of architecture. We discuss the general integrity
property that systems can only be trusted to manage modiable data
whose integrity is at or below that of their interface components. One
eect of this property is that in terms of integrity these hybrid-security
systems are only applicable to processing environments where the in-
tegrity of data is consistent with that of low-assurance software. Sev-
eral examples are provided of hybrid-security systems subject to these
limitations.
Keywords: integrity, condentiality, integrity capacity, secure system, multi-level
security
1. Introduction
Data integrity is dened as \the property that data has not been
exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction." [29] A
common interpretation is that high integrity information can be relied
upon as the basis for critical decisions. However, the protection of
high-integrity data in commercial systems has been both problematic
to achieve and often misunderstood.
1
2High Assurance Systems are designed to ensure the enforcement of
policies to protect the condentiality and integrity of information. To
date, high-assurance systems have been expensive to produce and often
lack support for, or compatibility with, standardized user-level applica-
tions. Hybrid security systems are intended to provide some desired func-
tionality with high assurance of correct policy enforcement by utilizing a
combination of high-assurance policy-enforcement components and low-
assurance user interface and application components, thus addressing
both the expense and compatibility problems typical of high-assurance
systems.
In an era when users demand the productivity enhancements aorded
by commercial software application suites, hybrid security architectures
are of particular interest. Extensive study has demonstrated that hy-
brid security architectures using commercial user interface components
can correctly enforce intended condentiality policies, e.g. [25]. Less
attention has been directed toward the eect of commercial user inter-
face software on the integrity of data managed through those interfaces.
Concerns include the integrity of the data modied using these commer-
cial interfaces and then stored by high assurance components, as well as
the integrity of data read from high assurance repositories and displayed
to users.
While some developers have indicated that this problem is something
\we have always known about," the problem may not be fully appreci-
ated by the consumers of these systems. Our premise is that builders
and buyers of systems designed to provide high assurance enforcement
of security policies should be aware of the impact of component and ar-
chitectural choices on the integrity of data that users intend to protect.
Although the problem is exacerbated in systems designed to implement
mandatory integrity models, such as represented by the Biba model [8],
it is also signicant in systems intended to support condentiality poli-
cies. The former systems have explicit integrity requirements, whereas
the latter may have implicit integrity expectations.
1.1 Contributions of this Paper
There is a large body of existing literature regarding integrity en-
forcement, requirements, and models; most of these address access con-
trol and related integrity issues, but do not address integrity capacity
problems of system composition.
The National Research Council report on \Trust in Cyberspace" [31]
identies the construction of trustworthy systems from untrustworthy
components as a \holy grail" for developers of trustworthy systems. And
Data Integrity Capacity of Secure Systems 3
a National Computer Security Center guideline[30] that addresses both
integrity and condentiality issues, states that \the ability to run un-
trusted applications on top of TCBs
1
without undue loss of security
is one of the major tenets of trusted computer systems." One of the
primary results of our paper is to clarify the limitations of a signicant
class of these approaches with respect to integrity.
In this paper we examine integrity capabilities of component-based
systems and provide a rigorous denition of system integrity capacity.
This denition can form a basis for reasoning about systems with respect
to their suitability for integrity policy enforcement. We also provide
examples of several contemporary research-level security systems that
exhibit the integrity capacity problem.
Finally, we provide a general conclusion regarding the integrity limi-
tations of hybrid-security system composition: namely, system compo-
sition is problematic with respect to maintenance of high integrity data
when utilizing commercial-grade products for user interfaces and appli-
cations.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 pro-
vides a brief discussion of some related eorts involving security and
integrity. We review concepts associated with condentiality, integrity,
and assurance in Section 3. Integrity considerations regarding system
components and abstract subjects are discussed in Section 4. Section
5 presents the notion of \system integrity capacity," and Section 6 pro-
vides a derivation of this capacity for hybrid security systems, several of
which are described. Our conclusions, in Section 7, complete the body
of the paper. A discussion of malicious artifacts in commercial systems
is included in Appendix 7.
2. Related Work
The architectural integrity issues we discuss have been addressed only
indirectly in the literature. For example, the Seaview papers ([13], etc.)
make it clear that the reference monitor will enforce integrity constraints
on its subjects, such as the relational database management component;






The terms used in this paper to reect the evaluation class of systems and components are
taken from [28] (e.g., B1 and B2) and [2] (e.g., EAL5).
4ponent as the interface to users will limit the integrity range of data that
the system can support.
The key issue addressed in our paper is how a system manages mod-
iable data. The Biba integrity model includes the restriction that a
subject may modify an object only if the subject's integrity label \dom-
inates" the object's integrity label. This and related characteristics of
the \strict" integrity model are discussed extensively in the literature,
starting with [8].
\Program integrity" [39] is related to strict Biba integrity, encompass-
ing all of the restrictions of Biba integrity except for those related to the
reading of les, while retaining restrictions for the execution of les.
Strict integrity treats execution as a form of reading, whereas program
integrity treats them separately [36]. Program integrity is of interest be-
cause it can be enforced with simple ring-bracket mechanisms [37], and
results in \dominance" or \protection" domains, which can be used to
enforce the relationships between the components, subjects and objects
discussed in Section 4.
Lipner [24] applies Biba integrity to a real-world business scenario,
working through the consistent application of hypothetical integrity la-
bels in the context of a Biba mechanism to protect commercial data from
unauthorized modication. This presentation does not address system
level integrity problems resulting from the utilization of components with
various integrity/assurance levels.
In contrast to low water-mark models, e.g. as discussed in [8], which
address changes to the integrity level of a subject as it accesses objects
with various integrity levels, we examine how the integrity value of data
is aected as it is passed through data-modifying components with het-
erogeneous integrity properties.
Boebert and Kain [9] recognize the asymmetry of condentiality and
integrity, and remark on the vulnerability of information to corruption
when only program integrity is enforced. Their work focussed on the use
of domain and type enforcement to construct \assured pipelines" where
the integrity level of data is changed as it moves through the pipeline.
It does not discuss how software could present intrinsic limitations on
the integrity of data to be processed.
Clark and Wilson [11] present a model for the protection of data
integrity in commercial systems. In that model, components that modify
data or handle user input must be \certied." However, their model does
not address the relative integrity of the components and the data, nor
does it address the resulting limits to the integrity of data that could be
processed by such a system.
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With respect to the problem of how to determine integrity labels for
objects, Amoroso [4] relates evaluation assurance to software integrity,
describing a broad range of (integrity) classes for articulating software
trust. Karger suggests that a representation of literal evaluation levels
could be used for integrity labels[19].
3. Background
This section sets the context for the presentation of system integrity
capacity and attendant problems. Several concepts are examined in re-
lation to integrity, including condentiality, data versus code, assurance
and trust, and multilevel security and the Biba model.
3.1 Integrity and Condentiality
A given piece of information will have a condentiality value as well as
a separate integrity value . That is, there will be separately measurable
eects (e.g., harm to the information owner) from the leakage vs. the
corruption of the information. This is the case whether or not the data
has been explicitly labeled with condentiality and integrity designations
(as is done in a multilevel-secure system). These labels may indicate
both the degree with which we intend to protect the data as well as our
assessment of the data's intrinsic value or sensitivity. The labels may
or may not correspond to the actual integrity or condentiality value
of the data (in general, multilevel security models address the security
values of the data; whereas the security labels are an implementation
issue).
Integrity is, in many ways, the \dual" of condentiality. Both integrity
and condentiality policies can be represented with labels that represent
equivalence classes whose relationships form a lattice [41, 14]. Access
control policy decisions can be based on the relative position of labels
within a given lattice. Increasing the condentiality \level" given to a
subject (e.g., user) generally expands the set of objects that the subject
may view; but an increase in integrity may contract the set of objects
that a subject may view. Such semantic \inversions," and the sometimes
non-symmetric nature of integrity and condentiality properties (e.g.,
see [9]) can make their dierences dicult to reason about. As a result,
the analysis of integrity may be overlooked or avoided during the system
design or acquisition process, in favor of more familiar condentiality
analyses.
63.2 Integrity of Data and Code
Integrity values are associated with executable software (e.g., pro-
grams, object code, code modules, components) as well as with passive
data. In both cases, the integrity value relates to how well the data or
program corresponds to its uncorrupted/unmodied original value (e.g.,
manufactured, installed, or shipped image). For programs, integrity
also describes how well a program's behavior corresponds to its intended
behavior (e.g., documented functionality or design documentation), in-
cluding the notion that the code does not provide functionality beyond
that which was intended (e.g., contain hidden behavioral artifacts). So,
\integrity" means that the code has been unaltered, or is faithful to its
origin, in both of these ways.
3.3 Assurance and Trust
Integrity of code is also closely related to \assurance" and \trust."
Products that have been through security evaluations [28][2] receive an
assurance-level designation. A methodical, high-assurance development
process may produce code with fewer aws, and consequently, behavior
that is closer to that which is intended, than a low-assurance develop-
ment process. Suitable security mechanisms and practices must also be
in place to ensure the ability of the system to protect itself and pro-
vide continued system integrity during operation. This reliable code is
sometimes called, or labeled, \high integrity;" it is also referred to as,
\high assurance" code. Based on this designation, the product may be
deemed suitable for handling data within a certain condentiality or in-
tegrity range. Systems or components with demonstrated capabilities
for security policy enforcement are sometimes called \trusted."
3.4 Multilevel Security
Multilevel systems partition data into equivalence classes that are
identied by security labels. Data of dierent sensitivities is stored in
dierent equivalence classes, such that (the data in) some equivalence
classes are \more sensitive than," \more reliable than," or \dominate"
(the data in) other equivalence classes. The dominance relation forms a
lattice with respect to the labels/classes, assuming the existence of la-
bels for universal greatest lower bound, GLB, and universal least upper
bound, LUB. A reference validation mechanism (RVM, see \multilevel
management component" in Figures 1, 2 and 3), mediates access to ob-
jects, controlling object creation, storage, access and I/O, thereby pre-
venting policy-violating data \leakage" across equivalence classes. For
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condentiality policy enforcement, a subject's (e.g., program or com-
ponent's) ability to write-down or read-up is prevented with respect to
the dominance relationship on condentiality labels; for Biba-model in-
tegrity, read-down and write-up are prevented with respect to the dom-
inance relationship on integrity labels. Most multilevel systems today
are designed to enforce condentiality constraints; some of these are also
designed to constrain ow between integrity equivalence classes.
4. Integrity of Components and Subjects
The purpose of this section is to examine how integrity is interpreted
with respect to the fundamental building blocks of secure systems.
The abstract architecture we are interested in is one of distributed
storage, processing, and interconnection \components." A component is
a functional system-level building block made up of software, rmware,
hardware or any combination of these. Multiple components may reside
on a single computer, but for simplicity's sake, we will assume that a
single component does not encompass multiple remotely-coupled com-
puters. Examples of components are shown in Section 6, and include
a relational database management system, a security kernel, a client
user application, an application server, and a graphical user interface
program.
A component can include multiple code modules. The modules may
be linked within a process, statically by a compiler/linker, or may have
a more dynamic, runtime, linkage. A component can also encompass
multiple processes, interconnected through message-passing, remote in-
vocation, or other mechanisms.
Subjects are a modeling abstraction for reasoning about the security
behavior of active computer elements such as programs and processes. A
primary criteria for identifying a set of active computer elements together
as a subject is that each subject has identiable security attributes (e.g.,
identity and security level) that are distinct from other subjects. If
the security attributes change over time, the elements are sometimes
modeled as a dierent subject.
A component may manifest one or more subjects at a time. Each
subject may encompass one or more of the component's modules, for
example when they are linked within the same process. In a monolithic
architecture, subjects may be identied with separate rings, or privilege
levels, of a process [28], especially if the program has dierent security
characteristics in the dierent rings. Typical systems support conden-
tiality and integrity labels for abstract subjects that are distinct from the
labels on related components and modules (an alternative design would
8be to derive the subject label directly from the xed component label).
For example, the assignment of a subject label may be a mapping from
the user's current \session level" to the subject representing the user.
There are semantic limitations on this assignment with respect to the
integrity level of the related modules and components.
4.1 Relation of Component and Subject
Integrity
First we consider condentiality. A subject may be associated with a
particular condentiality equivalence class for enforcement of mandatory
access control. The mandatory condentiality policy is not concerned
with what happens between subjects and objects that are in the same
condentiality equivalence class: all reads and writes are allowed. The
condentiality policy is only concerned with what happens when a sub-
ject attempts to access an object in another equivalence class. We can
interpret the subject reading data from a (source) equivalence class as
moving data from that source into the subject's (destination) equiva-
lence class, and writing to a (destination) equivalence class as moving
data from the subject's (source) equivalence class to the destination
equivalence class. The condentiality policy says that when data is
moved, the condentiality label of the destination must always domi-
nate the condentiality of the source (again, data cannot move down in
condentiality).
In contrast, while the integrity policy, too, is concerned with move-
ment of data across equivalence classes (the integrity label of the source
must dominate the integrity of the destination), this policy is also con-
cerned with the correctness of modications, such that even if the subject
is in the same equivalence class as the destination object, the modica-
tion must be that which has been requested: the allowed (e.g., intra-
equivalence-class) modications must be the correct, intended, modi-
cations. The tacit assumption in integrity-enforcing systems is that the
subject performs the correct modication (only) to its level of integrity
(or assurance, if you will). Since an abstract subject's behavior is dened
by its code, for coherent enforcement of integrity, the level of integrity
assigned to the subject must be no higher than the integrity value of its
code.
Components may not always receive an explicit security label, even
in a system with labeled modules and other objects. Components may
be composed of modules with dierent security labels. It is conceiv-
able that a given component could be composed of both high-integrity
and low-integrity modules, such that subjects with dierent integrity are
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supported by only modules of that same integrity. This would conform
to the requirement stated above that a subject's integrity should be no
greater than the integrity of its code. However, most commercial compo-
nents are not constructed this way. The simplifying assumption for this
analysis is that modules within a given component are homogeneous with
respect to their integrity, and the integrity of a component is the same
as the integrity of its constituent modules. Thus, we can can generalize
the stated requirement to be that the level of integrity assigned to an
abstract subject must be no greater than the integrity of the component
that manifests the subject.
Combining this component-subject integrity relationship with the subject-
object integrity relationship required for data modication (as per the
Biba model, above), we arrive at a transitive relationship between the
integrity of components and the objects which they access:
Given the sets of Components, Subjects, and Objects, where each sub-
ject in Subjects is an element of one component:
8 c 2 Components ; s 2 Subjects ; o 2 Objects :
current access(s; o;modify) and s 2 c )
integrity(c)  integrity(s)  integrity(o)
Systems that enforce integrity policies are generally intended to au-
tomatically ensure the correct relationship between the integrity level
of subjects and the integrity level of accessed objects. However, the
enforcement of the relationship between a subject's integrity and its
component's integrity may be less clear. Some systems may be able
to enforce the relationship between the integrity of subjects and their
related modules. For example, this could be enforced by Biba-like la-
bels on executables or other program integrity mechanisms such as rings
[38] and ring brackets [1] which can also be represented as attributes
on system elements. If these relationships are not enforced during run-
time, then the correct relationships may need to be maintained by social
convention/procedure.
The relationship between the integrity of a component's subjects and
the integrity of the non-software portion of the component is also en-
forced via social convention (again, component integrity must dominate
the subject integrity).
4.2 Component Integrity Labels
This leaves the question of correct integrity labeling of components
(and modules). Condentiality and integrity labels of passive data ob-
jects can be correctly assigned based on the data owner's perception of
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the object's sensitivity (e.g., harm caused by unauthorized disclosure or
modication).
For active objects (viz, code rather than data) integrity labels, as
well as condentiality labels, are usually assigned by the system or net-
work security designer to maximize system security and functionality
while being consistent with the principle of least privilege [35]. Best
judgment may play a large role in this assignment. For example, if
a monolithically-compiled software component is made of up diversely-
assured internal modules, it may be the responsibility of a designer,
integrator or conguration manager, as stipulated by social convention
or procedures, to assign an appropriate integrity level to the executable
component. However, the pedigree of the code establishes a real-world
limit to the integrity label that can be associated with a component.
Intuitively, code that has unknown integrity characteristics, e.g., it is
found on the street, should not be accorded a high-integrity label.
The \Yellow Book"[27] is an example of a scheme for determining
condentiality ranges based on the evaluation or assurance level of the
components involved, where higher assurance components are allowed to
be associated with greater condentiality ranges. However, there is no
\Yellow Book" for integrity to show what integrity label should be al-
lowed or inferred for a code component based on its evaluation/assurance
level, although some schemes have been suggested[4, 19].
4.3 Commercial Application Component
Integrity
Commercial application components are of particular interest with re-
spect to correct integrity labeling in hybrid security architecture systems
(see Section 6). We dene commercial application components to have
been either unevaluated with respect to security policy enforcement, or
evaluated below Class B2/EAL5
3
. In the security and evaluation com-
munity, components evaluated below B2/EAL5 have historically been
considered to be \low assurance" (see, for example, [22]). This is so for
several reasons [28, 2]:
Weak developmental assurance, for example to ensure that un-
intended malicious artifacts (e.g., Trojan horses and trap doors)
are not inserted during manufacture. There is no or very little
requirement for system conguration management. There is no
requirement for conguration management of development tools.
3
As there have been few, if any, commercial applications evaluated at B2 or higher, we
consider this to be a conservative, non-exclusionary, denition.
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Little or no code analysis, and no examination of code for malicious
artifacts after manufacture (i.e., during evaluation). There is no
requirement for code correspondence
4
to the system specication
or for justication of non-policy-enforcing modules. There is no re-
quirement for internal structure (e.g., modularity or minimization)
which would enable the meaningful analysis of code functionality.
Weak assurance that malicious artifacts are not inserted after man-
ufacture. For example, there is no requirement for trusted distri-
bution procedures: no assurance that the system delivered to the
end customer is in fact the intended or specied system.
Recall that the semantics of a code integrity label includes an indi-
cation of how its behavior corresponds to an intended (e.g., specied)
behavior. The fact that there is little assurance that code that has been
evaluated below B2/EAL5 functions (only) the way it is supposed to,
indicates that there must be a corresponding limit to the value of an
integrity label associated with such code (see Appendix 7). We will call
this integrity limit, nominally, \low assurance," and assert that compo-
nents evaluated below B2/EAL5 should be labeled at this, or some lower
level. Similarly, code that has not been evaluated at all would be at-
tributed with a (nominal) \no assurance" integrity label. The names of
these two labels or the precise evaluation class names are not signicant;
rather, it is signicant to the maintenance of data integrity in hybrid se-
curity systems that site security managers/administrators, data owners,
and other security policy stake-holders understand the integrity value of
their systems' components and of the data entrusted to these systems.
5. Security System Data Capacities
In this section, the notion of system integrity capacity will be intro-
duced. This term relates to the ability of a system to handle high-
integrity data.
The network architecture of a multilevel system can help to ensure
that the actions of other components are constrained by its RVM, for
example, through limiting the interconnections or data paths allowed
between components. In the architectures discussed in this paper, the
separation of data is maintained by either: (1) partitioning the data (and
processing elements) into distinct physical equivalence classes and using
the RVM to ensure that the security level of the user session matches
4
Mapping of each specied function to the code that implements it, and accounting for
unmapped code.
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the security level of the class with which it is connected (e.g., Figure 2),
or (2) using the RVM to logically partition the dierent data equiva-
lence classes and to match the user session level to only the appropriate
domain(s) (see Figures 1 and 3).
Our central question is, \for what range of user data
5
can we trust
such a multilevel system, or any system, to maintain data separation?"
Clearly, we would not want to trust a very weak system to protect/separate
very highly sensitive information. While our focus is on integrity-related
issues, for comparison we will examine cases of both condentiality and
integrity.
5.1 Condentiality Capacity
For condentiality, a multilevel system can be trusted to manage data
to the condentiality range of its RVM. We call this the system conden-
tiality capacity. For example, if the system's RVM component is assigned
or is otherwise deemed capable of managing a range from Unclassied
to Secret, we can say the system as a whole is trusted to handle data in
that range. This is because the RVM will constrain the actions of the
other components to not leak data across equivalence classes, regardless
of the level of trust we have in those other components (given a coherent
network architecture). To state condentiality capacity more formally,
consider a system, C, comprising a set of components, fcg, and let RVM
be a component in C that enforces the condentiality policy on other
components. Then,
c capacity(C) = c capacity(RVM)
5.2 Integrity Capacity
For integrity, on the other hand, a system can be trusted to manage
modiable data (only) to the integrity limit of its interface components,
where interface components include the various graphical user interfaces
and data management applications through which users' data must pass.
This is the \system integrity capacity."
System integrity capacity is dierent from (i.e., not the \dual" of)
system condentiality capacity because we assume that a component
will handle modication of objects correctly, only to its level of in-
tegrity/assurance. For condentiality, even if a non-RVM component
were infected with malicious code, it could not exltrate the informa-
tion across the equivalence-class boundary, because the RVM component
won't let that happen. However, for integrity, once the component has
5
The ability of a system to protect and maintain system data is not addressed in this paper.
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approval for modify access, the RVM is powerless to ensure that the
correct, and only the correct, modications are made. Therefore, the
assurance level of the individual (viz, non-RVM) component has bear-
ing on its assigned integrity label, but is not necessarily relevant to its
assigned condentiality label.
The input and output mechanisms of a computer system limit the
quantity and quality of information that ows through the system, just
as the in- and out-ow of water and electricity are limited in hydraulic
and electrical systems by their interface devices.
For computers, the I/O mechanisms and related applications, by def-
inition, handle all data entering and leaving the system. Where those
mechanisms and applications are congured to be able to modify data,
they can potentially eect the integrity of the data entering and leaving
the system. The nature of this eect is as follows.
Denitions
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modify : a relation that denes the fact that a component
c 2 C has been used to to modify an object o 2 O
SYS : a system comprised of a set of components c 2 C
Axiom 1
A modied datum is either unchanged in integrity, or takes on an in-
herent integrity value dominated by the integrity of the data-modifying
component.
8 c 2 SYS; o 2 O : modify(c; o)) integrity(c)  integrity(o
0
)
For example, if a \certied" datum is modied by an \untrusted" code
component, the modied datum becomes at best \untrusted," assuming
that \certied" dominates \untrusted." If an \untrusted" datum is mod-
ied by a \certied" component, the datum becomes at best \certied,"
indicating it might have been upgraded in integrity.
For a high-assurance integrity-enforcing system, subjects, including
the applications that manage user I/O, will be limited by the RVM from
modifying protected objects that are above the subject's integrity level.
However, if the application is responsible for passing data from one of
those objects to, for example, an output device like the computer screen,
then the application can simply modify the data in passing without
modifying the source object.
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Similarly, even if a component does not modify the data directly, it
may request that the modication be done by another component, for
example, where a user interface component requests from another (e.g.,
remote) component that an object be created on behalf of the user.
Since the requesting component might request the wrong modication,
we consider it to be a \data-modifying" component. So a system's \data-
modifying" components are those components that are able to modify
or control the modication of user data. In general, all interface com-
ponents and other components on the \path" between the user who
requests a data access and the ultimate data source (for data reads) or
destination (for data writes) are \data-modifying" components, unless
they can be guaranteed to not modify, create or delete user data objects
or control such operations
6
.
Therefore, even for systems that enforce integrity policies, a computer
system can only be trusted to manage modiable data whose integrity
is at or below that of its user interface and application components.
This is true even if the data is either (1) integrity-upgraded internally
by various components, (2) \hand installed" into high integrity internal
objects, or (3) imported from specialized high integrity sensing devices,
since to be useful, the data will once again be \handled" by the standard
interface and application components for access by users. We will note
that, theoretically, manual procedures, such as visual inspection of data
items retrieved from a hybrid security system, could be used to ensure
that processing corruption has not occured, however, this is not generally
feasible in commercial or production environments.
As a group, then, the interface components and associated applica-
tions determine the integrity limit of the data that a system can handle
(i capacity). The interface components are a subset of SYS, indicated
SYS
interface
, and the highest integrity data obtainable from a system
SYS is by way of the user interface component with the highest integrity








This gives a \best case" analysis for the integrity that we might expect
a system to handle. For example, a high integrity interface application,
were it to be available, dependent upon a low integrity database, would
not normally improve the integrity of data returned from the database to
6
The \control" part of this denition makes it broader than the Bell and LaPadula[7] concept
of \current access," which indicates only objects with direct access to data.
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the user, although this expression of system integrity capacity would in-
dicate that the data accessed through the high integrity interface might
be of high integrity. The general case is that the i capacity expression
must allow for such upgrades. However, not all systems are designed for
data integrity upgrades. A more conservative axiom regarding modica-
tion, which does not consider upgrading, results in an i capacity based
on the lowest integrity of the components in each path.
Axiom 2
A modied datum takes on an inherent integrity value that is the great-
est lower bound of the data and the data-modifying component.
8 c 2 C ; o 2 O : modify(c; o))
integrity(o
0
) = GLB(integrity(c); integrity(o))
We now dene an individual data transfer within the system, a path
through the system, and the integrity of such a path.
trans: A relation on C C that denes an individual transfer of data
between components. Data is passed directly from the origin component,
c
i
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the origin of the second coincide[34]. For example, this is a path with



























Given these denitions, we provide the alternative, more conservative,
expression for i capacity.











6. Hybrid Security Systems
The systems we are concerned with are those that combine low-assurance
commercial components and specialized (e.g., high-assurance) multilevel
components specically to enforce mandatory security policies while us-
ing commercial user-level interfaces and applications. These systems, as
a class, are composed of the following components:
commercial terminals or workstations
commercial user interfaces, applications and application servers




The interested reader is referred to [17] for a detailed description of
these components. Of particular note, however, is the description of ap-
plications. In the generic \hybrid security" architecture dened in [17],
applications interface with the user and participate in the management
of all user data. Specically, the application components have the abil-
ity to modify data on behalf of the user (which is to say that read-only
systems are not of interest). The general functionality of commercial
applications such as word processing, spread sheet, slide presentation,
time management, and database tools indicate that, to be useful, they
are intended to modify, as well as read, data.
To illustrate the relevance of our concerns for the handling of high in-
tegrity data in hybrid security systems, we describe here several systems
from the security literature that exhibit dependence on the integrity of
commercial components.
A non-distributed version of the model architecture is shown in Fig-
ure 1. In this layout, the component interconnections consist of process-
internal communications. The lowest layer (viz, \ring") of the process
is a multilevel kernel or operating system, with an application (e.g.,
multilevel-aware RDBMS) and user interface in higher layers. A sepa-
rate process is created for each security level. An example of this version
of the architecture is that of the Seaview project [15, 25], and \Purple
Penelope" [33] (the latter includes a degenerate case of a RVM). A vari-
ation on this theme is the trusted Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
architecture, in which a separate version of the OS, in addition to the
application and user interface, is created at each security level[20, 26, 6],
and multilevel management occurs below that in the VMM layer.




















Figure 1. Single Process Architecture (Network Connections are degenerate.)
A simple distributed instantiation is shown in Figure 2. Here, there
are logically separate single-level workstations connected by a switch to
data management subsystems at dierent (single) levels. Software asso-
ciated with the switch ensures that the current level of the workstation
matches the level of data subsystem indicated by the switch setting. An
example of this version of the architecture is that of the Starlight project
[5] (Starlight may allow low condentiality information to ow through
the switch to high sessions, providing \read-down" capability).
The third instantiation of the model architecture is shown in Fig-
ure 3. In this layout, there are logically separate single-level terminals
(multiplexed onto one physical terminal by purging of state between
session-level changes) connected via TCB extensions to multilevel-aware
application server(s) running on the multilevel (TCB) component. An
example of this version of the architecture is that of the Naval Postgrad-
uate School's Monterey Secure Architecture (MYSEA) system, based on
[18].
6.1 Integrity Capacity of Hybrid Security
Systems
Based on the preceding discussion, the system integrity capacity of
















































Figure 3. Distributed Multilevel Server Architecture
A system's integrity capacity is the LUB of the integrity of its
interface/application components.
All interface/application components in hybrid security systems
are commercial
Commercial interface/application components are of \no assur-
ance" or \low assurance" integrity.
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Therefore, the system integrity capacity of a hybrid security system
is generally no higher than \no assurance" or \low assurance."
An implication of this conclusion is that hybrid security architecture
systems are not suitable for automated information processing environ-
ments in which there are expectations or requirements to maintain data
integrity above the nominal \no assurance" or \low assurance" level. An-
other implication is that composition of trusted systems utilizing only
commercial products as interface components is problematic with respect
to integrity.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
We have shown that the integrity of a computer system's interface
components limits the data \integrity capacity" of the system. This
is in contrast to the \condentiality capacity" of a system, which is
determined by characteristics of the system's policy-enforcement com-
ponent(s), but is not dependent on the interface components.
We have discussed why commercial components should not be at-
tributed with integrity properties above a certain \low-assurance" level,
and that hybrid security systems should not be trusted with data whose
integrity is above that level. An implication from this conclusion is
that hybrid security systems are not suitable in computing environments
where there is an expectation of maintaining data integrity above this
basic, low-assurance level.
Situations where corrupted data could have signicant consequences
are:
A legal setting where the \truth" of data might be questioned
Handling of high integrity intelligence data for critical decision
making
The production of high assurance system components
Systems where human life might be aected by improper execution
of code
High reliability embedded systems
We have concentrated on issues of integrity in multilevel secure sys-
tems, however, the distinctions we have made are germane to other sys-
tems where weak integrity components are utilized and stronger data
integrity is expected.
One might say, \what dierence does it make if a component has too
high of an integrity label, and its real integrity value is low? These
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commercial software vendors can be generally trusted, since it is in their
best interest to ship a product that does not corrupt data." This atti-
tude reects a common misunderstanding of data integrity enforcement.
Certainly, most security analysts and engineers would agree that high-
assurance policy-enforcement components are needed to safeguard the
condentiality of highly sensitive multilevel data; then, why would there
be any lesser concern for the ability of a system to protect the integrity
of highly sensitive data? From a more technical viewpoint, if a system's
objects do not have data sensitivity (condentiality and integrity) labels
that match the objects' real sensitivity values, then the system does
not correspond to its model, and its behavior may be undened. Also,
refer to Appendix 7, for a review of common \Subversive Artifacts in
Commercial Software."
The result presented in this paper places a limit on what is achievable
in system integrity architectures. Such a nding can help to rene the
direction for constructive eorts and does not preclude the construction
of useful systems any more than other negative results, e.g. [16, 21],
have in the past.
One might also ask if high integrity is ever achievable. The answer is
yes, but not with the type of commodity application components avail-
able today (viz, where commodity implies weak integrity of software
functionality). Systems that could provide high integrity today are (1)
a system composed entirely of high-assurance components, or (2) a sys-
tem that protects high integrity data from modication by all but high-
assurance components. Examples of the rst are systems intended to
perform safety-critical functions such as avionics and certain medical
systems[23]. An example of the second is a client-server system com-
posed of high-assurance client (e.g., web browser) and server components
that encrypt their communication such that it is protected from modi-
cation during transit through low assurance network components (e.g.,
via a Virtual-Private-Network-style connection). As noted previously,
such systems carry the expense of custom high-assurance development.
Appendix: Subversive Artifacts in Commercial Soft-
ware
There is clear evidence that subversion of commercial software through hidden
entry points (trap doors) and disguised functions (Trojan horses) is more common
than generally perceived. Entire web sites [3] are devoted to describing clandestine
code which may be activated using undocumented keystrokes in standard commercial
applications. Sometimes this code merely displays a list of the software developers'
names. Other times the eects are extremely elaborate as in the case of a ight
simulator embedded in versions of the Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet software. That
these \Easter Eggs" are merely the benign legacy of the programming team is perhaps
Data Integrity Capacity of Secure Systems 21
a reection of the general good intentions of the programmers. Malicious insertions,
such as long-term time bombs, are just as easily possible.
An indication of the serious nature of the problem was provided in April 2000 when
news reports created a mild hysteria surrounding the possibility of a trapdoor in the
code of a widely used web server[32]. Subsequent investigations revealed that instead
of a trapdoor, the code contained nasty remarks about corporate competitors and
well as violations of company coding standards[12]. The fact remains, however, that
when rumors of the trapdoor were initially published, few believed that artices of
this type were possible in such a popular software product. However, millions of users
do not eliminate the problem of low integrity. Another example of the vulnerability of
commercial source code occured in October 2000, when it was revealed that outsiders
had access to the development environment of a major software vendor for some
period of time[10].
In his Turing Prize Lecture, Ken Thompson described a trapdoor in an early
version of the Unix operating system [40]. The cleverness of the artice was evident
in that the artice was said to have been inserted into the operating system executable
code by the compiler, which had been modied so that recompilations of the compiler
itself would insert the trapdoor implantation mechanism into its executable while
leaving no evidence of the trapdoor in the source code for either the operating system
or the the compiler. The presence of this sort of trap door is speculative in any
compiler and must be addressed through life-cycle assurance of tools chosen for high
assurance system development.
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